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Statutory Procedural Requirements for County Zoning 
Administration in Minnesota 
Robert W. Snyder 
Introduction 
In May I97 4, as part of a comprehensive amendment to the 
planning enabling legislation for counties, Minnesota law-
makers dramatically revised procedural requirements for ordi-
nance administration. The general result was to reduce sharply 
the degree of discretion in the assignment of administrative 
responsibilities and to mandate hearing, notice, and review 
procedures for variances, conditional uses, and rezoning. 
Because of a grandfather clause that later was revised, the 
new procedures could not be enforced for at least four years. 
The deadline was August I, 1978. This publication discusses 
the new administrative procedures. 
Most Minnesota counties were granted general authority to 
regulate land use and development through adoption of zoning 
ordinances and other "official controls" when Chapter 599, 
Laws of Minnesota, 1959 became effective in August of that 
year. 1 Much of the language of that act was patterned after the 
Standard Zoning Enabling Act (hereinafter SZEA) and the Stan-
dard City Planning Enabling Act (hereinafter CPEA) published 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1926 and I928, re-
spectively. Although some of the weaknesses in that I959 
county planning act (hereinafter I959 CPA) are striking when 
looked back on, it remained basically unchanged for 15 years. 
During the early part of this time, this authority was little 
used, but after I964, when section 701 of the Federal Housing 
Act of I954 was changed to make all counties eligible for 
federal financial grants for "comprehensive planning," many 
counties accordingly chose to adopt ordinances developed by 
planning consultants contracting with counties. 2 Regulatory 
activity increased with the advent of the state shoreland manage-
ment program. This was based on a I969 Minnesota statute that 
required counties to regulate land use and development in de-
fined shoreland areas by July I, I972. 
The need for amending the I959 CPA became clearer with 
experience in administering zoning ordinances and other offi-
cial controls. The Jack of procedural guidelines was quite 
troublesome. Aware of rising concern, the Association of Min-
nesota Counties introduced amendatory legislation. Recom-
mendations were sought from several sources, including a land 
use committee made up of elected county officials, two county 
planning directors, a county attorney, and an extension land 
economist from the University of Minnesota. 
After successive drafts had been considered, identical bills, 
Senate File (SF) 2576 and House File (HF) 2591, were intro-
duced into the legislature. In the Senate, after the adoption of 
several minor amendments recommended by the Committee on 
Local Government, SF2576 was passed on March 8, I974. The 
House chose to operate somewhat differently. After adopting 
amendments recommended by the Committee on Environ-
mental Protection and Natural Resources, but before final pas-
sage, HF 259I was compared with the passed Senate companion 
bill and indefinitely postponed. In the alternative, the House 
amended SF 2576 to conform with the postponed house bill, 
repulsed an attempt to rerefer it to committee, accepted three 
further amendments presented on the floor, and adopted a re-
vised SF 2576. Following a Senate refusal to concur in the 
House action on SF 2576, a conference committee considered 
both versions and reported back with a bill that was passed by 
both houses and signed into law by the governor. 
The I974legislation dealt with many sides of the regulatory 
powers of county governments in Minnesota, but largely it 
called for an overhaul of zoning administration. This publica-
tion centers on these matters. It will consider the county plan-
ning act as amended (hereinafter CPAA), not solely the 1974 
legislation. 
The Minnesota action is especially interesting since it repre-
sents a rejection of both the underlying philosophy and the 
recommendations of the American Law Institute (ALI) as con-
tained in Article 2 of the Model Land Development Code 
(MLDC). A brief discussion will show the major differences in 
the two approaches. 
While the writers of the MLDC recognized widespread 
confusion about the proper use of traditional administrative and 
enforcement plans, they tried to solve the problem by introduc-
ing new terminology and giving the local legislative unit almost 
complete discretion in delegating administrative and ministerial 
powers. Under the ALI model, all decisions involving the 
exercise of discretion in granting or withholding permission to 
build, occupy, or develop land and structures, including rezon-
ing amendments, are made by a ''land development agency.'' 
This agency might be "the governing body or any committee, 
commission, board, or officer of the local government.'' Per-
mission would be granted in the form of a ''special development 
permit,'' regardless of the legal or theoretical basis for exercis-
ing discretion in that particular case. 
The distinctions between "use" variances, "non-use" vari-
ances, conditional use permits (sometimes called special per-
mits), exceptions, and rezoning-all provided for, though 
unnamed-would be seen only in the nature of the result of the 
grant or denial of the request and the reasons stated for it. Only 
vague and general standards to guide decisions of the land 
development agency are required. Procedural mandates are 
strict in comparison, with extensive hearing and notice provi-
sions and requiring a complete record of written findings of fact 
and conclusions and express reasons for all such decisions. 
In the new Minnesota legislation, the attention to discretion-
ary administrative procedures suggests agreement with a basic 
fact that seems to underline the ALI approach: many regulatory 
problems can be traced to widespread confusion about the 
proper use of traditional administrative flexibility devices. But 
Minnesota has rejected the ALI notion that the cure consists of 
supplanting customary terminology and separation of functions 
within the governmental structure. Instead, the statute uses and 
'Some counties received authority to enact zoning regulations by legislation passed in 1939 and 1941. 
2Copies of all county ordinances in effect on March 1, 1973, including date of adoption, are on file with the writer. 
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carefully defines selected terms denoting different types of 
administrative devices and limits the assignment of discretion-
ary powers by county units so as to mandate or encourage a clear 
separation of authority to respond to different types of land-
owner requests on an individual basis. Thus it is in nomencla-
ture and in the degree of local discretion to use a variety of 
organizational arrangements that the widest divergence can be 
seen. 
A brief outline of the Minnesota approach will show the 
contrast. The Minnesota CPAA identifies by name and specifies 
the composition of two citizen boards appointed by the legisla-
tive county board: the planning commission and the board of 
adjustment. The representation of elected officials on both is 
restricted. Discretionary administrative decisions, also identi-
fied by name. are assigned by statute. Rezoning is the ultimate 
sole responsibility of the county board. Quasi-judicial relief in 
the forn1 of· 'non-use·' variances may be obtained only from the 
board of adjustment, and only if statutory findings are present. 
.. Use" variances are declared unlawful. 
Conditionally permitted land development activity or con-
struction. defined as a "conditional use," may be authorized 
only after consideration by the planning commission and only 
after locally formulated but statutorily required itemized stan-
dards and criteria have been satisfied. Final authority to allow 
conditional uses may be delegated to the planning commission 
or reserved to the county board. Detailed and individualized 
minimum notice and hearing requirements are set by statute (an 
area of agreement with the MLDC). 
The Minnesota CPPA differs from the standard zoning and 
planning acts that established the norm for most state enabling 
laws, including much of the 1959 CPA, most notably by the 
enormous! y greater detail, taking advantage of decades of expe-
rience and court decisions in states with a long history of land 
use controls. A striking departure from that norm is found, 
however. in provisions allowing assignment of discretionary 
authority to allow conditional uses (called "exceptions" in the 
standard act) to the planning commission or the governing body 
rather than the board of adjustment. Rejection of the traditional 
division of authority may have been motivated by a belief that 
some problems encountered in discretionary administration of 
zoning arose because of a failure to understand important dis-
tinctions between the granting of variances and the approval of 
conditionally permitted development and that the failure may 
have been partially caused by placing the authority for both in a 
single body, the board of adjustment. 
Going to a detailed look at the end product of legislation, it 
will help to note that this discussion is limited to statutory 
provisions related to the discretionary administration of zoning 
regulations. "Discretionary administration" is defined to in-
clude, as well as issuing variances and conditional use permits, 
adopting amendments that do nothing but change the district 
classification of one or a few parcels of land. Though this 
inclusion defies the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court, 
which has declared such amendments (often referred to as 
"rezoning") to be legislative, not administrative, in nature, it is 
satisfactory for our purposes. 3 We will consider, first, statutory 
provisions affecting the character and authority of governmental 
entities in which the power to make discretionary administrative 
decisions is or may be vested and, second, provisions concern-
ing the exercise of the three types of discretion. 
The County Board 
The county board, more properly but unusually called the 
board of county commissioners, is the governing legislative 
body at the county level in Minnesota. It includes five county 
residents elected for staggered four-year terms from five 
geographic districts (including urban places) as nearly equal in 
population as possible. 4 Because decisions by the county board 
are subject to limited court review, it may, when statutory 
mandates to the contrary are lacking, exercise a much greater 
degree of discretion than nonelective bodies. Its members are, 
of course, at the same time subject to more intense political 
influence than are members of appointed boards and 
commissions . 
The Planning Commission 
The largest appointed body involved with discretionary 
county zoning administration in Minnesota is likely to be a 
citizen board statutorily provided for and now statutorily called 
the planning commission. The name is taken from the CPEA, 
which assigned to the planning commission final authority on 
the approval of land subdivision plats. The CPEA also stated 
that, if appointed, the commission was to have with respect to 
zoning the same duties as and replace a similar body provided 
for in the SZEA and called therein a zoning commission. These 
latter duties were strictly advisory. 
In Minnesota, perhaps because sole authority to approve 
land subdivision plats was already vested in the county board, so 
that these decisions were not to be made by the commission, the 
1959 CPA used the term "planning advisory commission." 
This name, discouraging the assignment of nonadvisory func-
tions to the commission, prevailed until the 1974 amendment 
eliminated the middle term and clearly authorized the exercise 
of delegated nonadvisory functions. 
Several statutory provisions, some added in the 197 4 
amendment, supply procedural mandates and limit the county 
board's discretion in choosing a planning commission. One of 
the more interesting provisions says that the commission must 
be appointed by ordinance, triggering a statutory prior public 
notice requirement. This newly imposed rule may be unneces-
sarily burdensome, particularly when the appointment concerns 
replacing retiring commission members making up only a frac-
tion of total membership. The legislature may have intended 
only that the creation of the planning commission as an official 
entity be done by ordinance, as in the case of the board of 
adjustment, rather than the appointment of members to the 
commission. But such an interpretation can be reached only by 
straining the rather clear language of the statute. 
Few surprises appear in the composition requirements. Al-
though not specifically declared by the statute, there are two 
classes of membership: regular and ex-officio. Only regular 
3 1t might be noted that there is legal precedent elsewhere for the classification used here. Fasano v. Board of Commissioners, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P. 2d 23 (1973), 
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash 2d 292, 502 P2d 327 (1972). 
4Exceptions: (1) Counties with an area exceeding 5,000 square miles and a population exceeding 75,000 have seven-man boards. (2) The board for Ramsey County 
comprises seven members. 
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members (5 to 11 may be appointed) hold the power to vote. 
Language added in I974 makes it very clear that only one 
regular member may be a county officer or employee. Previ-
ously, one member was to be a county commissioner, but 
additional representation by elected officials was not specifi-
cally prevented. If political detachment will lead to greater 
objectivity without an offsetting reduction in sense of responsi-
bility, the change should have a positive influence. 
Residency requirements, still present but less stringent after 
the 1974 amendment, continue to reflect an unfortunate pref-
erence for absolute numbers instead of more meaningful per-
centages. The deletion of a previous mandate that at least 3 of 
the 5 to II members be "electors" living in unincorporated 
areas, as provided in both bills as introduced, survived commit-
tee action in both houses. But it was supplanted by a House floor 
amendment to SF 2576 that was retained in the passed con-
ference committee bill. Consequently, the law now provides for 
a minimum representation of two residents of unincorporated 
areas. Given the likely representation of rural interests on the 
county board and limitations on the territory affected by county 
zoning ordinances, 5 the effect of this requirement is 
questionable. 
Far more significant is a new provision that forbids service 
on the commission as a regular member by anyone who has 
received during the past two years any substantial portion of his 
or her income from "business operations involving the develop-
ment of land within the county for urban and urban-related 
purposes." This apparently strong antidevelopment posture 
first appeared as a committee amendment to HF 2591 that 
restricted representation to one such individual. The same lan-
guage was continued in the House version of SF 2576, but the 
more restrictive measure appeared in the conference committee 
bill that was enacted. 
This absolute prohibition may be an overreaction to sugges-
tions that land use planning is often ineffective because decision 
making bodies are controlled by developer interests. To the 
extent the statutory mandate is observed, it is likely to bias the 
attitude of the planning commission and seriously affect its 
ability to represent all citizens in the county. This will both 
lessen the commission's value in an advisory capacity and 
reduce the probability that the more broadly representative 
county board, whose members, especially in developing areas, 
are likely to be sympathetic to development interests, will 
delegate to the commission any final decision-making author-
ity. Neither outcome seems desirable. However, failure to ob-
serve the statutory rule may open any decision by the planning 
commission to attack on jurisdictional grounds. 
The planning commission's ability to reach wise decisions 
may be enhanced by the optional appointment of technicians 
and other knowledgeable persons as ex-officio members. Such 
appointments, though not limited by number, are confined to 
persons holding positions as county officers and employees. 6 A 
committee amendment to HF 2591 extending ex-officio ap-
pointment to employees of the state and federal government, 
though continued in the House version of SF 2576, did not 
appear in the final conference bill. This means that some useful 
technicians, such as district conservationists of the Soil Conser-
vation Service, USDA, may not serve on the commission in an 
ex-officio capacity. They may, of course, participate usefully in 
other ways. 
Capabilities of the planning commission also may improve 
as a result of provisions added in 1974 for compensation to its 
members in an amount to be determined by the county board. 
Previously, payments were limited to reimbursement for ex-
penses. 7 The new allowance may help attract more highly 
qualified and respected members of the county community to 
serve. 
Duties and Responsibilities 
of the Planning Commission 
Under pre-1974 law, the planning commission's role was 
described in terms of assisting the ''planning agency'' in carry-
ing out its duties, including developing recommended official 
controls. The "planning agency" was defined as the planning 
director, planning commission or department, or the office of a 
planning or zoning director or inspector; and the board of 
adjustment; plus staff members, employees, and consultants of 
these entities. Organizational patterns and operational relation-
ships under this arrangement were unclear. Through the 1974 
deletion of these provisions and adoption of a new subdivision 
directing the planning commission to cooperate with the plan-
ning director and other county employees in developing recom-
mendations to the county board, the commission should be more 
independent. · 
In a somewhat similar way, the planning commission before 
the 1974 amendments had to conduct public hearings on all 
proposed rezoning actions, then report its findings and conclu-
sions to the "planning agency" for forwarding with planning 
agency comments to the county board. This provision also has 
been deleted, but the commission is now one of several entities 
to which the county board may assign responsibility for con-
ducting public hearings for' 'one or more purposes,'' including 
rezoning. With respect to rezoning, the commission's position 
now is assured an opportunity for expression through statutorily 
declared powers of review before the enactment of any ordi-
nance amendment, including rezoning, by the board. 
A 1974 statutory change with the potential for more far-
reaching consequences concerns the planning commission's 
role in conditional use permit administration. Previously, the 
statutory name, "planning advisory commission," coupled 
with duties described primarily in terms of assisting and advis-
ing other entities, as in the familiar SZEA, apparently induced a 
belief that county officials could not delegate final administra-
tive decision-making authority to the commission. Reinforce-
ment for that limitation could be found in the stated position of. 
51n most Minnesota counties, the majority of the total county population, which elects the county board, lives in unincorporated areas. Even where not true 
because of a larger city in a particular county, the board is very unlikely to fail to appoint at least two rural residents to a body concerned almost exclusively with 
land use planning and control outside incorporated areas. 
61n 1973,61 counties reported ex-officio planning commission members. Positions commonly represented were highway engineer, agricultural extension agent, 
attorney, zoning administrator and auditor. Numbers can become excessive. In 1973 one county reported 17 ex-officio members. R. Snyder, Organizational 
Arrangements for County Planning, Ag. Ext. Serv. Sp. Rapt. 48 (rev. 1976, Minn.). 
71t might be noted that even these payments were prohibited by the CPEA (§ 4) and that the Minnesota municipal planning act and the MLDC avoid the issue 
altogether. 
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some officials of the State Planning Agency that issuing condi-
tional use permits resulted in a change of use equal to rezoning 
and, therefore, should be done only by the legislative board of 
county commissioners. 8 
Although this characterization seems, in looking back, to 
have reflected a misunderstanding of the proper role of condi-
tional use permits, the influence of its assertion strengthened a 
natural preference of county board members to keep a close hold 
on land use planning and zoning because of their potentially 
politically destructive nature. The effect of these forces is re-
flected by conditions in 1973, when only 10 percent of all 
county zoning ordinances gave the planning advisory com-
mission final authority to act on requests for conditional use 
permits. 
A new statutory provision now expressly authorizes the 
county board to delegate this authority to planning commis-
sions, prohibits such delegation to any other entity, and man-
dates review by the planning commission before any final 
decision whenever the board elects to keep the authority to 
itself. If counties choose to delegate, which other sections of 
the CPAA tend to encourage, the availability of expertise 
represented by ex-officio membership and through cooperation 
with the planning director and other employees will rise in 
significance. 
The Board of Adjustment 
As it has since 1959, the Minnesota county planning act 
continues to require that a body designated therein as a board of 
adjustment be created by the county board at the time that the 
county adopts a zoning ordinance or any other "official con-
trol." The method and term of appointment of persons serving 
on the board, and the designation of their duties and functions in 
addition to those assigned by statute, are determined by the 
board of county commissioners within statutorily established 
limits. Conforming to language added by the 1974 amendment, 
such decisions must be done by ordinance, requiring prior 
public notice of official action; thus, frequent changes are un-
likely. The size of the board, fixed at three until 1974, now may 
vary from three to seven members. A predictable consequence 
will be a five-person board made up of one member from each of 
the five county commissioner districts. 
The make-up of the board of adjustment is subject to certain 
statutory constraints that remain unchanged by the 1974 
amendments. From a quasi-constitutional viewpoint, the most 
interesting is the one barring appointment to the board of (I) any 
elected official or (2) any employee of the board of county 
commissioners. 
This observation of the historical separation-of-powers doc-
trine should make the board of adjustment a truly quasi-judicial 
body capable of making more objective, almost wholly apoliti-
cal decisions. It presents a sharp contrast: Minnesota's munici-
pal planning act expressly allows the governing body to serve as 
its own board of adjustment. It also differs from MLDC which is 
even less restrictive than the municipal planning act, and the 
1926 SZEA which seemed to assume, but does not mandate, 
separateness. 
The completely separate status also frees the county board 
and its individual members from time consuming or administra-
tive or quasi-judicial matters, allowing more careful attention to 
weightier governmental policy issues. Control over actions of 
the board of adjustment may be exercised through procedural 
requirements and other directions or, in probably rare cases, 
legal attack. 
To a planner, another continuing compositional mandate 
may be of at least equal interest: one member of the board of 
adjustment is required to be a member of the planning commis-
sion, if one has been appointed. 9 
The apparent purpose is to help assure that land use planning 
principles are considered in the board's deliberations. Since 
''one'' is a minimum, not a fixed number, the complete board of 
adjustment also may serve on the planning commission. In 
1973, when the size of the board was limited to three, a survey 
showed that this actually was the case in seven counties. In eight 
additional cases, two members of the board were also planning 
commissioners. Some overlap seems wise, but an excessive 
amount (I) concentrates citizen participation in fewer persons 
and (2) may lead to a pro-planning, pro-regulate bias that would 
distort the board's intermediary role. 
The possibility of conflict-of-interest problems also is ad-
dressed by language added in the 1974 amendment. First, provi-
sion is made for appointing an alternate member on three-person 
boards who may vote when a regular member's vote might be 
suspect. Second, regardless of the size of the board, a member 
with a potential conflict of interest who does not voluntarily 
abstain from voting on a given issue may be disqualified by a 
majority vote of the other regular members of the board. This 
may or may not in fact change the nature of the law, but the 
express directive should encourage the board to take greater care 
in observing proper procedures. 
Another new provision that may help improve the calibre of 
decisions by the board of adjustment authorizes compensation 
to regular and alternate members over and above their necessary 
expenses. The amount and method of payment is left to local 
discretion. Previously, only reimbursement of expenses was 
allowed. 
Another provision added in 1974 seems of questionable 
value, though not because the underlying motive is wrong. In a 
House floor amendment to SF 2576 that reappeared in the 
enacted conference bill, it was specified that at least one mem-
ber be appointed from unincorporated areas of the county. As in 
the case of a similar mandate for planning commissions, the new 
provision seems unnecessary. 
Duties and Responsibilities of 
the Board of Adjustment 
It was in the specification of powers directly granted to the 
board of adjustment without delegation by the county board that 
the pre-197 4 statute may have been the most inadequate. The 
1959 CPA declared that there were two such powers: (l) to act 
as an appellate body with respect to decisional acts of zoning 
enforcement officers and (2) to "act upon all questions as they 
9Based on personal experience of the writer as a participant in workshops sponsored by the State Planning Agency in the late 1960's. 
9As of 1973, all but one county coming under these provisions had appointed planning commissions. R. Snyder, Organizational Arrangements for County 
Planning, Agri. Ext. Ser. Sp. Rapt. 48 (rev. 1976, Minn.). 
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may arise in the administration of any ordinance,'' including the 
interpretation of a zoning map. The latter, as would be ex-
pected, was the source of many difficulties. We will consider 
both in order. 
Much of statutory language with respect to the board's 
general appellate power was taken or adapted from the SZEA. It 
confines the board's jurisdiction to appeals from acts of code 
enforcement officers; authorizes the board to affirm, reverse, or 
modify a contested action; and provides that the board's deci-
sion is final except for appeal in a de novo 10 trial in district 
court. 
New provisions resulting from the 1974 amendments, noted 
here without discussion, are: (I) a mandatory stay of all pro-
ceedings arising from the action appealed from, (2) the addition 
of required notice to the public of the hearings on the appeal, 11 
(3) a mandate that the stated reasons for the board's decision be 
in writing, (4) the extension of express statutory standing to 
appeal board of adjustment decisions to district court to all 
boards, departments, and commissions of the county and of the 
state, and (5) the imposition of mandatory recording of all 
orders of the board acting on such appeals with the county 
recorder or registrar of titles. 12 13 
The broader language in the pre-197 4 statute granting to the 
board of adjustment the power to act on all administrative 
questions "as they may arise" was preceded by a mandatory 
"shall" that apparently left no option to the county board as to 
the placement of administrative functions. Its origin is not 
known to this writer, but it was part of the original 1959 act. It 
may have· been meant as an equivalent alternative to phrases in 
the SZEA to the effect that the board of adjustment "shall" have 
the power to authorize variances and to issue conditional use 
permits. If so, the same language would also have included 
power to act on appeals, making the express grant of that 
authority in the 1959 act redundant. 
With adoption of recent amendments, interpretation prob-
lems have largely evaporated, but responses in the form of 
county zoning ordinance provisions are interesting. It appears 
that the offending clause generally was treated as ambiguous. 
Interpreted literally, for example, it would have required that all 
conditional use permits be issued only by order of the board of 
adjustment. Actually this was true in 1973 for only 28 percent of 
all county zoning ordinances. 14 Literal compliance was much 
higher, 83 percent, with respect to variances, but it still was less 
than complete. 
Since 1974, there can be no doubt as to the proper assign-
ment of these administrative functions. The amendatory lan-
guage states that the board of adjustment shall have the 
exclusive power to grant variances, discussed in detail here, 
along with its appellate duties and responsibilities. 
The authority to grant conditional use permits, also dis-
cussed here, may not be exercised by or delegated to .the board 
of adjustment, and is reserved at the option of the county board 
to itself or the planning commission. This may end a period of 
statutorily derived administrative confusion in county zoning in 
Minnesota. 
Administrative Procedures for Rezoning 
As indicated before "rezoning" means an amendment to an 
ordinance that changes the district classification of one or a few, 
usually adjoining parcels of property, most commonly owned 
by a single party requesting the amendment. Since rezoning is 
seen as a legislative act in Minnesota, court review is limited by 
the separation-of-powers doctrine, allowing a great deal of 
discretion by the county board. Consequently, there is less legal 
protection against arbitrary, politically motivated acts in rezon-
ing than in variances or conditional use permits. 
Only a few statutory constraints relate to rezoning. They can 
be placed into two categories: (I) those applying to any zoning 
ordinance amendment and (2) those applying only to those 
amendments defined herein as rezoning. As to those applying to 
any amendment, before the 1974 amendment, amendments, 
although adoptable by resolution and therefore not subject to the 
nominal notice requirements for all county ordinances, could 
nevertheless be adopted only after a public hearing conducted 
by the planning commission, if there was such a body. Subse-
quently, the planning commission was required to send findings 
and conclusions based on the hearing to the ''planning agency,'' 
which in tum was required to forward the same to the county 
board along with "such comments and recommendations" as it 
deemed necessary. 
As a result of 1974 amendments, somewhat different proce-
dures continue but expand notice and hearing mandates while 
enhancing the influence of the planning commission. All 
amendments are now required to be adopted by the county board 
by ordinance, bringing the action within the scope of Minn. 
Stat. §375.51. The latter was revised in 1974 to provide in the 
case of zoning ordinances and other "official controls" for a 
mandatory prior hearing after 10 days' public notice. In addi-
tion, another new provision requires written notice of the hear-
ing to the governing bodies of all cities and townships in the 
county. 
A hearing by the planning commission may still be used to 
satisfy this requirement. The county board also now has the 
option of assigning responsibility for this type of hearing, as 
well as others, to any county official or employee. This clears 
the way for the appointment of a ''hearing examiner'' who may 
possess or develop special skills for such occasions and bring 
greater formality to the hearing process. (Although there is a 
cross reference here to Minn. Stat. §375.51, the latter provides 
no further guidance on the matter.) 
Whether or not the planning commission conducts the hear-
ing, it now must have an opportunity to pass judgment on all 
amendment proposals before passage. By express statutory lan-
guage, amendments may be initiated by the county board and by 
10De novo means the court will consider additional evidence, not just matters considered in the original decision. 
"Compare public hearing notice requirements for variance discussed on page 13. 
12The apparent rationale for the recordation is the presumed benefits to potential buyers or future owners. Its value seems questionable. See p. 60 infra. 
131t might be noted here that the MLDC has no provisions for quasi-judicial appellate action regarding code enforcement officer decisions. The ombudsman land 
development agency, whatever its make-up or character, is considered to have made the decision itself. 
14The percentage undoubtedly would have been lower in the absence of guidance from a model shoreland management ordinance promulgated by the state 
Department of Natural Resources that designated the board of adjustment for this function. Minn. Reg. Cons. 77. (1970 ed.). 
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petition of affected property owners. as well as the planning 
commission itself. The county board may not act on any pro-
posed amendment not initiated by the planning commission 
until it has received the commission's recommendation after 
appropriate study. 
The commission in turn is directed to cooperate with the 
planning director and other county employees in preparing and 
recommending amendments for adoption. The directive un-
doubtedly carries over to imply coercion to cooperate in review-
ing amendments from other sources. Apparently the intent was 
to prevent the commission from refusing to consider the views 
of such experts and other employees in making reports to the 
county board. 
When it comes to final enactment by the county board, 
public notice must be given of the meeting at which the 
amendment will be considered. The proposal must be approved 
by a majority vote of all members of the board, not just those 
present. 
The second category of statutory constraints, those that 
apply only to amendments characterized as rezoning, encom-
passes a single additional public hearing notice requirement: to 
all owners of record within one-half mile of the affected prop-
erty. This further requirement came down from a 1976 
amendment flowing from the controversy over the scope of 
newly required notice for hearings on other discretionary ad-
ministrative acts. Although the resulting statutory language 
drawing rezoning hearings into the more detailed express writ-
ten notice requirement is a bit clumsy, the interpretation given 
here. though ferhaps leading to some redundancy, 15 seems 
unavoidable. 1 
The singularity of the additional notice requirement may 
belie its significance, for it is the first inkling that the Minnesota 
legislature may be edging close to a statutory declaration that 
rezoning is to be legally classified as an administrative act, 
rather than legislative. This is a positive sign for those con-
cerned about the way that seemingly arbitrary rezoning type 
amendments sweep away the protection apparently provided by 
zoning to farmers and other landowners in fringe areas of 
suburbia. 
Though the scarcity of further statutory restraints subdues 
enthusiasm, such restraints are perhaps properly omitted. As 
long as rezoning activities are considered legislative acts, thus 
subject to limited court review, statutorily imposed require-
ments concerning standards and criteria, findings, and reasons 
may interfere improperly with the exercise of authority by an 
elected representative body. The new notice, hearing, andre-
view procedures may broaden the information base and alter the 
weight the county board chooses to assign to interests affected 
by rezoning. But these procedures must be viewed as minor 
impediments to what in some cases may be an arbitrary decision 
nearly untouchable by the courts. 17 
Administrative Procedures for Issuing 
Conditional Use Permits 
Conditional use permits in one form or another have long 
been part of comprehensive zoning. Since at least 1926, when 
the SZEA was published, it has been recognized that appropri-
ate locations and acceptable physical features of certain quite 
proper uses of land could not be predetermined and set forth in a 
zoning ordinance. Permits for such land uses customarily are 
issued by a body with the discretionary power to determine ( 1) 
whether a particular use should be allowed at all at the proposed 
location and (2) the development standards that must be ob-
served if the development is to be allowed to proceed. 
Generally, land uses needing such specialized treatment 
have inherent characteristics that make them potentially much 
more damaging to the interest of other property owners and the 
public than other land uses allowed as a matter of right in 
compliance with pre-ordained standards (e.g., principal uses). 
They have passed under various titles, including conditional 
uses, special exception, special uses, and special permit uses. 
Discretionary approval authority may have been vested in the 
governing body or delegated elsewhere. In any case, the courts 
have insisted that the applicant be protected against arbitrary 
denial or other unfair treatment infringing on constitutionally 
protected rights of due process and freedom from unlawful 
discrimination. 
Before the 1974 amendment to the 1959 CPA, Minnesota 
enabling legislation for land use planning by all political subdi-
visions was silent on nomenclature and procedures that might be 
used for land uses needing this specialized treatment. 18 Influ-
enced by planning consultants, a model shore land ordinance 
promulgated by DNR, and other sources of guidance, counties 
proceeded to include provisions of this type in their ordinances. 
But they lacked statewide consistency. Thus, in 1973, the term 
"conditional use" appeared in 72 percent of ordinances with 
zoning provisions, but "special use" was found in 24 percent. 
Other terms also were used. 
Even more variation could be seen with respect to granting 
authority. It was vested in the county board in two-thirds of the 
ordinances, in the board of adjustment in 28 percent, and in the 
planning commission in 10 percent. 19 Similar inconsistencies 
appeared in hearing and notice requirements and other 
provisions. 
Even if authority to use this administrative device could be 
implied from general language in the enabling legislation, as the 
Minnesota Supreme Court found in Zylka v. Crystal, the need 
for statutory guidelines was clear. These were, in 1974, sup-
plied in abundant detail by a wholly new section found in the 
CPAA, supplemented by revisions and additions in related parts 
of the statute. 
15Both the first and last paragraphs of Minn. Stat. §394.26 (2) (1976) have the effect of requiring notice to any city within two miles and the situs township of the 
affected property. 
16The office of the attorney general does not agree with this interpretation. Letter from Michael R. Gallagher to Benton Co. Attorney RichardT. Jessen, Jan. 17, 
1978. 
17The MLDC does treat rezoning amendments as administrative, stipulating that decisions must be supported by findings and conclusions based on a record as if 
a "special development permission" had been granted. Op. Cit. §2-312. In this respect the MLDC seems superior to the Minnesota statute. The MLDC also would 
allow rezoning decisional authority to be delegated to an administrative body. Op. Cit. 2-302. 
16Minnesota is one of nine states where the statutes are silent on this matter. Most states adopted provisions identical to or modeled after the SZEA, which 
contained almost no detail or procedural guidance, but used the term "special exception" and assigned granting authority to the board of adjustment. 
19ld. Some ordinances used more than one granting body. The situation was particularly confusing in counties that had adopted both a shoreland ordinance and a 
county wide ordinance, with each granting this authority to a different body. 
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The statutory amendments accomplished eight things: I) 
provided a common nomenclature and definitions; 2) mandated 
that zoning ordinances shall contain standards and criteria for all 
land uses designated therein for approval on a discretionary 
basis (conditional uses); 3) limited the assignment of decisional 
authority; 4) set forth minimum notice and hearing require-
ments; 5) provided for special restrictions; 6) made special 
allowance for environmental concerns; 7) required recordation 
of issued permits; and 8) clarified continuity of permits. These 
will be discussed in order. 
Nomenclature and Definition 
The added statutory material defines and exclusively uses 
"conditional use" to refer to land developments and develop-
ment activities to be approved on a discretionary basis. The term 
seems appropriate. It was already being used in most county 
ordinances and conveys a clearer sense of the manner and 
purpose of the regulatory measures applied to land uses so 
designated, i.e., permission will be granted on condition that 
certain standards and criteria are met, but also may be condi-
tioned on the observance of special restrictions. It also avoids 
the erroneous implication of the term used in the SZEA, '' spe-
cial exception,'' that the development or land use was an excep-
tion from ordinance requirements, making hazy the distinction 
between conditionally permitted uses and those allowed pursu-
ant to a variance. 
But the true significance of the statutory terminology is 
simply that it is now part of the law, setting a standard for 
uniformity that can reduce the obvious communication and 
educational problems that occur when multiple terms are used. 
According to the definition, "conditional use means a land 
use or development as defined by ordinance that would not be 
appropriate generally but may be allowed'' if certain conditions 
exist. This is meant to include land development activity (e.g., 
draining or filling a wetland), as well as the use of land or 
buildings for some identifiable purpose. It is expressly extended 
to "planned unit developments" which, though not statutorily 
defined, are usually considered to include some land areas 
owned in common and multiple land uses. 20 It is also clear that 
the legislature recognized the value of placing conditional uses 
in subcategories that might be handled differently under a local 
ordinance. 
The conditions referred to in the definition include: (I) 
conditions detailed in the zoning ordinance (standards and crite-
ria as discussed in the next section); (2) conformity with the 
"comprehensive land use plan of the county;" and (3) compati-
bility with the existing neighborhood. The plan-conformity 
requirement is somewhat unclear since the amended statute 
implies elsewhere that a comprehensive plan shall be the basis 
for official controls on! y when adopted by ordinance. In contrast 
to Minnesota's municipal planning act, there is no provision for 
adopting "comprehensive" or "comprehensive land use" 
plans by the county planning commission or any ''planning 
agency" except for the governing body. It seems unlikely that 
the legislature intended to give legal effect to a plan with no 
official sanction. 
Another somewhat puzzling situtation is presented by the 
appearance after the 1974 amendment of the term "site plan 
regulations'' as an example of official controls. Site plan regula-
tions or site plan approval involves the use of discretion in a 
manner virtually indistinguishable from that involved in issuing 
conditional use permits, especially those for planned unit devel-
opments. Did the legislature intend that counties might regulate 
site plans without observing the statutorily imposed procedures 
for conditional use permits? Is "site plan regulations" another 
term describing subdivision controls and a mere redundancy 
since the term "subdivision controls" is found immediately 
preceding? Or is site plan approval only a step toward the 
granting of a conditional use permit? These and other positions 
are arguable. Such vagueness may encourage counties wishing 
to avoid certain procedural mandates for conditional use permit 
administration to adopt "site plan" ordinances as an 
alternative. 
Standards and Criteria 
The statute now· requires that zoning ordinances include 
standards and criteria to be used in determining whether to issue 
a conditional use permit for a given proposal. This may repre-
sent a notable change from previous law. The Supreme Court in 
this state, unlike some other states, has not found that constitu-
tionally protected rights were violated when conditional uses 
were simply listed in the ordinance without standards or criteria 
that would guide a decision-making body or inform a landowner 
or developer of what might be required of him, as long as the 
decision were made by the governing body. This has allowed 
almost complete discretion to be exercised, with little protection 
against arbitrary and discriminatory treatment without resort to 
litigation. 
The standards and criteria now required may do much to 
reduce the possibility that such treatment will occur in the 
future. Although there is no mandate that they must be quantita-
tive rather than qualitative as much as possible and it is clear that 
the less defiqitive criteria may be stated as an alternative (to 
standards), the fact that the ordinance must contain "insofar as 
practicable, requirements specific to each designated condi-
tional use" could have far-reaching significance. 
The initial impact may seem to be a negative one, since 
counties will need to fund studies suitable for developing the 
required specific standards and criteria and then assume the cost 
of incorporating them into zoning ordinances by appropriate 
amendments. 21 
In the longer perspective, however, exercising the approval 
authority for conditional uses may be easier because of the 
guidance provided by the ordinance, leaving less need for a 
broad-ranging study of the impact of each proposed use and 
greater opportunity to consider more carefully questions left 
unresolved by the predeveloped standards and criteria. 
This could greatly aid the decisional process and produce 
more uniform and objectively established results, since the 
major factors in reaching a decision will have been determined 
before the identity or character of the applicant becomes known. 
An applicant may also find it to his advantage to know to an 
201d. The lack of express provisions and guidelines for planned unit developments remains one of the universal shortcomings of planning enabling 
legislation for local units in Minnesota. Although "cluster developments" are provided for in the administrative regulations relating to shoreland 
management and a special condominium statute has been enacted, neither is adequate for this purpose. 
21Th is imposition may have been a major factor underlying the legislative decision to delay the required date of compliance with new ordinance and procedural 
requirements an additional year (to 1978) after the effective date of the 1974 amendments. Minn. Stat. §394.312 1977 Supp. 
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appropriate degree the standards and criteria that will be used as 
bases for judging his proposal. This might, among other things, 
afford a presentation that supplies the facts and circumstances 
relevant to the ordinance requirements. 
Another impact may lie in the possibility that fewer types of 
developments will be treated as conditional uses. Studies may 
reveal that some. perhaps many, kinds of development intended 
at first to be treated as conditional uses may be allowed as a 
matter of right if they comply with detailed quantitative stan-
dards based on study findings. Some take the position that 
excessive use of the conditional use technique is a serious 
problem in land use control. If this view is correct, a tendency 
toward reducing it is a positive step. 
Finally, the ordinance standards and criteria requirement 
may weigh heavily on a county board's decision to reserve final 
decision-making authority to itself or to delegate it to the plan-
ning commission. Previously, as has been observed, if the 
power were reserved to the elected body, no ordinance stan-
dards and criteria were considered necessary. The opposite was 
true, however, if the power were delegated. 
The practical implication of this could not have been lost on 
local officials. Under the new rules, delegation may be viewed 
more favorably, gaining the advantages of lowered administra-
tive costs, less delay to the applicant, reduced likelihood of 
politically motivated decisions, and more opportunity for the 
county board to do more "sittin' and rockin" over more signifi-
cant policy decisions. These outcomes must remain conjectural 
since the reaction by counties is still uncertain, but the potential 
for improving the decision-making climate seems clear. 
Assignment of Decisional Authority 
As already noted, previous law discouraged the county 
board in Minnesota from delegating its authority to order the 
issuance of conditional use permits to an appointed body. 
Among those that did, a large majority followed the suggestion 
supplied by the SZEA and chose the board of adjustment. The 
CPAA makes delegation to that body unlawful, but it expressly 
permits delegation to the planning commission. It also now 
requires review by the planning commission even if decisional 
power is retained by the county board. 
Moreover, the reservation-delegation decision is not just an 
either-or situation. If the county board wishes to maintain direct 
control over some listed conditional uses, for example those 
with stronger potential political repercussions, the statutory 
language strongly suggesting categorizing conditional uses may 
lead them to delegate when other conditional uses are involved. 
A precedent for this arrangement appears in ordinances already 
adopted in certain counties. 22 
Notice and Hearing Requirements 
Action on conditional use permit applications must now take 
place with full opportunity for interested parties to participate. 
The statute as amended in 1974 provided that a public hearing 
must be held with notice to the public, the township containing 
the affected property, nearby municipalities, and property own-
ers of record within one-half mile. The last requirement proved 
to be controversial and was revised in 1976 to provide for notice 
to all owners of record within one-quarter mile of the affected 
property, or the I 0 properties nearest the affected property, 
whichever would involve more landowners. 
Even as revised, the new provisions mandate a notable 
change from past procedure. In 1973, fewer than 60 percent of 
county zoning ordinances gave such notice to the public, nearby 
municipalities, and neighboring landowners, usually those 
within 500 feet. Fewer than one-third notified the township. A 
few ordinances had no hearing or notice requirements. 
The statutorily mandated notices help assure responsible 
action by the decision-making body. However, they may also 
assist neighboring landowners in influencing decisions toward a 
result favorable to them at the expense of impartial treatment of 
the applicant. This would seem not to be a serious consequence, 
since resisting landowners are likely to learn of the proposal 
even if notice is limited. Court action will still be necessary to 
correct such injustices. 
Effect on the Environment 
A new special grant of authority, which seems suggestive 
rather than meaningful in a legalistic sense, states that the 
county board may ''request'' that the applicant for a conditional 
use permit "demonstrate the nature and extent" of any 
''material adverse effect on the environment'' that the planning 
commission has identified as a possibility. Although the under-
lying concept is similar to that of the environmental policy act 
(which calls for an environmental impact statement when the 
physical environment may be seriously endangered) the lack of 
guidelines and of power to demand such environmental infor-
mation, rather than "request" it, makes the legislative intent 
uncertain. 
There would seem to be no reason why the applicant should 
not be required to submit environmental impact information to 
satisfy an appropriately phrased standard or criteria listed in the 
zoning ordinance. Perhaps the new statutory language is meant 
only to cover cases where the ordinance has no such standard but 
the board wishes to expand its review of a proposed conditional 
use if the applicant will cooperate. 
Whatever its meaning, the statute can be overlooked easily 
since it is located in a separate section distant from and unre-
ferred to by the detailed section on conditional use permit 
administration. Its location may be explained by the fact that it 
was not part of the amending bills as introduced but was added 
in a modified form by committee action in the House. It was 
retained in the House version of SF 2576 and in the conference 
bill finally enacted. 
Special Restrictions 
Land uses or developments treated as conditional uses are 
often so categorized because of their potentially negative impact 
on the value and enjoyment of neighboring properties or the 
neighborhood in general. As noted earlier, a conditional use by 
definition may be allowed only if it is "compatible with the 
existing neighborhood.'' 
To adequately protect against any negative effects, the body 
responsible for issuing conditional use permits is authorized by 
statute to attach ''such additional restrictions or conditions as it 
deems necessary to protect the public interest." This seems to 
restore to the decisional body a large part of the flexibility it may 
have lost as a result of the ordinance standards and criteria 
requirements. Although the process would not go as far as 
absolute prohibition, the use of the property might be so re-
stricted as to have the same practical effect. 
22Freeborn County Zoning Ordinance, adopted Aug. 1, 1967. Olmsted County Zoning Ordinance, adopted Jan. 2, 1970. 
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Unreasonable restrictions, of course, may be declared un-
lawful by a court of law, but court delays and attorney's fees 
may make this an ineffective remedy in many cases. One can 
argue that the flexibility is necessary and advantageous, despite 
the possibility of abuse, since it offers opportunities for a greater 
mixing of land uses, which may be convenient and cost-saving, 
with minimal conflict. The statute does not itself place limits on 
or specify the types of restrictions that can be imposed, but it 
does give some examples: "matters relating to appearance, 
lighting, hours of operation, and performance characteristics." 
From these examples, it would appear that the legislature had in 
mind commercial, light industrial, and perhaps agricultural land 
uses, rather than residential. 
Recordation 
If approved conditional uses are subject to special restric-
tions and conditions not appearing in the ordinance, a future 
owner, though perhaps legally bound, could acquire the prop-
erty without knowing that such encumbrances exist. This is now 
guarded against by a new statutory mandatory filing of record of 
all conditional use permits with the county recorder or registrar 
of titles. 
If one presumes that restrictions and criteria attached to the 
permit will appear on it, recordation may be the most effective 
way to give notice and limit enforcement problems against a 
succession of landowners. There seems, however, to be little 
reason to require recording of permits when no special restric-
tions and conditions are attached. All ordinances are recorded 
even though they by statute do not constitute encumbrances on 
property. 
The statute also states that ''restrictive covenants may be 
entered into regarding such matters'' as special restrictions and 
conditions. This seems to contribute little since exercising the 
police power does not depend on such encumbrances, whether 
recorded or not. 
Continuity 
Whether a conditional use permit may be used as a practical 
substitute for a system of periodic licensing by issuing tempo-
rary permits is largely resolved by a statutory declaration that 
such a permit "shall remain in effect for so long as the condi-
tions agreed upon are observed." This, of course, raises the 
question of whether periodic renewal of the permit may be 
imposed as a condition at the time of initial approval. Such an 
interpretation seems unlikely since it would remove most or all 
meaning to the statutory declaration. More supporting evidence 
is given by the suggested types of restrictions and conditions. 
Though not meant to be inclusive, they may, by applying the 
rule of expressio unius, exclusio alterius23 , then, preclude 
imposing restrictions and criteria dissimilar from and unrelated 
to the statutory examples. A condition limiting the permit to a 
term would seem to fall in this category. 
Another provision insures that the required continued valid-
ity of conditional use permits shall not interfere with enforcing 
any restrictions that might be imposed by future legislation. 
Such legislation might, for example, alter development stan-
dards or land use restrictions to make the conditional use a 
nonconformity and thus expose it to limits on expansion, recon-
struction or, in an extreme situation, to termination after an 
appropriate amortization period. 
Administrative Procedures for Issuing Variances 
From their start in the early 1900's, comprehensive zoning 
laws and ordinances have recognized that the uniform enforce-
ment of set standards and restrictions over a designated area, 
such as a zoning district, would not necessarily cause uniform 
hardship among landowners. To prevent injustice to property 
owners presented with an unusually burdensome situation, a 
device called a variance was used to allow departure from the 
strict terms of the ordinance. Variances were specifically pro-
vided for in the SZEA and in most state enabling statutes. As we 
have seen, despite such language in the earlier municipal plan-
ning legislation, Minnesota's original county planning act was 
an exception. 
As Minnesota counties began adopting zoning ordinances in 
the sixties and early seventies, the statutory vacuum with re-
spect to variances was filled first by the expert but generally 
nonlegal advice of planning consultant firms hired to develop 
land use plans and ordinances. After 1970 it was filled by 
administrative rules concerning control of development in 
shoreland areas then published by the state Department of Natu-
ral Resources. 
The results, revealed by a survey of all county ordinances in 
effect in March 1973, demonstrate the shortcomings of the 
statute. Although only three of 104 ordinances failed to provide 
for the issuing of variances, there was considerably less consen-
sus on just how this traditional means of providing relief to 
harshly affected landowners was to be used. In designating the 
granting body, for example, the board of adjustment was chosen 
in 83 percent of the ordinances, but 12 and 5 percent specified 
the county board and planning commission, respectively. In 
four counties that had each adopted two ordinances, the docu-
ments failed to agree on the assignment of this important quasi-
judicial function. 
As has been observed, this question was resolved when the 
1974 amendment declared that the board of adjustment "shall 
have exclusive authority to order the issuance of variances.'' 
Other areas of confusion needing statutory resolution included, 
among other things, the definition of a lawful variance, hearing 
and notice procedures, and findings necessary to justify a vari-
ance. How the legislature addressed these and related issues will 
be discussed here. 
What Does 'Variance' Mean? 
A basic problem was definition. The word "variance" is an 
ambiguous term, since it may be used in both a technical and 
generic sense. Even when used technically, it may convey 
different messages to different people. Courts in several states 
and the legal community in general have for a long time recog-
nized a major distinction between a "use" variance, which 
allowed deviation from the restrictions on types of land uses 
permitted, and a "non-use" variance, generally used to allow 
deviation from dimensional standards, such as building set-back 
or lot area requirements. Interpretative problems of this nature 
are met in the 197 4 amendment by ( 1) including a definition of 
"variance," and (2) expressly prohibiting the issuing of vari-
ances that would' 'allow any use that is prohibited in the zoning 
district in whi& the subject property is located." 
Problems that might arise if, after definition, "variance" is 
used in a generic sense, are avoided by a definition that is itself 
23This is a rule of law that statutory examples limit judicial interpretation of a law that is much broader on its face if interpreted literally. 
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essentially generic: "any modification of variation of official 
controls" where because of "exceptional circumstances" strict 
enforcement would cause unnecessary hardship. 
An attempt to be more specific failed in the legislature. A 
committee-sponsored amendment to the original bill HF 2591 
would have altered the definition to confine variance to "modi-
fications or variations of land development standards contained 
in official controls.'' Though adopted in the House and appear-
ing in the House version of SF 2576, the amendment was not 
present in the enacted conference bill. 
The House bill amendment may have been wise. Under the 
present language the broad powers of the board of adjustment 
appear to extend to allowing deviation from procedural require-
ments, the assignment of responsibilities, and many other types 
of provisions found in zoning ordinances. This much flexibility 
is probably unnecessary and could interfere with the effective-
ness of statutory safeguards against misuse of regulatory power. 
The provision that makes issuing unlawful "use" vari-
ances. quoted above, and nearly identical to one found in the 
municipal planning act, eliminates any prior uncertainty that 
may have made county officials uneasy, since legality of' 'use'' 
variances was questionable even before they were statutorily 
prohibited. Courts in some but not all states have found their 
issuance equivalent to rezoning and unlawful without full com-
pliance with procedures required for amending a zoning ordi-
nance. The need for legislative clarification was also indicated 
by an observed lack of uniformity and consistency. County 
ordinances in 1973 were split 60-40 on the question of "use" 
variances, with most allowing for their issuance. In II counties 
with multiple zoning ordinances, the ordinances failed to agree 
on this rather significant issue. 
When Is a Variance a Proper Remedy? 
In a new subdivision to section 394.27, the l9741egislature 
attempted to set forth in considerable detail an exclusive set of 
circumstances that would justify the issuing of a variance. 
Unfortunately, not all ambiguities have been eliminated. Some 
background will be useful. 
The two phrases used in granting variances are "practical 
difficulties'' and ''unnecessary hardship,'' the latter referring to 
a greater level of landowner frustration. In some places a paral-
lel has been drawn between these phrases and the type of 
variance involved. The courts may find practical difficulty 
sufficient to justify a "non-use" variance but may require a 
finding of unnecessary hardship to grant the presumably more 
disruptive "use" variance. In other places, the two phrases are 
treated as having largely the same meaning, and any distinction 
between grounds for use and non-use variances is based on 
factual circumstances aside from the phrasing. 
Neither the Minnesota courts nor the legislature has ad-
dressed this issue enough to solve the dilemma. The municipal 
planning act, which bars "use" variances, uses the single 
phrase ··undue hardship'' without defining it, except for requir-
ing that the hardship must exist because of circumstances unique 
to that particular property. The Supreme Court, deciding a 
"non-use" variance controversy in St. Paul, quoted both the 
statute and language in the St. Paul ordinance, including the 
phrase "practical difficulties or peculiar hardship." It found 
evidence to support a finding of both practical difficulties and 
undue hardship but made no commitment as to the meaning of 
the two terms. 
The 1974 legislature was equally unhelpful. The bills 
amending the county planning act as introduced, in defining 
"variance" indicated that they might be granted in cases of 
unnecessary hardship or because strict conformity with an ordi-
nance "would be unreasonable, impracticable, or infeasible 
under the circumstances.'' A suspicion that this meant practical 
difficulty was sufficient grounds for granting a variance seemed 
to be confirmed by language in a new detailed subdivision on 
variances that provided that they might be granted only "when 
there are practical difficulties and particular hardship. " 24 
The subsequent legislative history is complicated, but nec-
essary to fully appraise the state of the law. In the House, HF 
2591 was altered to eliminate the phrase ''practical difficulties'' 
from the new subdivision and remove the "practical difficulty" 
language from the definition. No "companion amendments" 
were made to the Senate bill, which, therefore, continued to 
recognize practical difficulties as a basis for a non-use variance, 
until the House substituted its own version of SF 2576 for the 
passed Senate bill. The conference committee, apparently as a 
compromise, left the phrase "practical difficulty" in the new 
subdivision on variances (as a basis for granting a variance) but 
struck the "practical difficulty" language from the definition. 
This was accepted by both houses in adopting the conference 
bill. 
The end product leaves uncertain the legality of variances 
issued on the basis of practical difficulties not severe enough to 
qualify as unnecessary hardships. Ironically, the legislative 
history, if anything, contributes to the uncertainty. Without it, 
the great detail defining the elements of unnecessary hardship, 
contrasted with the single use of the phrase "practical diffi-
culty" with no explanatory language, suggests that the latter is 
just another term for the former, as some courts have found. 
Knowing the differences between the two houses of the legisla-
ture and the compromise outcome suggests that the term ''prac-
tical difficulty" is meant to have independent significance. 
A second ambiguity as to lawful grounds for granting vari-
ances can be found in language in the new detailed subdivision 
on variances used to define hardship. The original bills both 
indicated that hardship meant, among other things, that the 
property could not yield an "equitable return" and that there 
was no "economic use" for the property. This phrasing is 
similar to that widely used by the courts. Although neither 
"equitable" nor "economic" was defined, they clearly imply 
a sense of fairness within the framework of the marketplace. 
The use of the property must not be so restricted that it limits the 
number of potential buyers so as effectively to take it off the 
market altogether, since no reasonable person would be willing 
to assume the costs of ownership. Such a criterion leaves room 
for discretion, but only within the context of the market. 
The legislature found these criteria unsatisfactory. Both 
bills were revised to delete any direct reference to economic 
circumstances and to introduce language incorporating a more 
abstract "reasonable use" concept. This now appears in the 
enacted law. Replacing the equitable return concept with one 
using "put to a reasonable use" as a criterion may at first seem 
"reasonable," but closer inspection suggests that reasonable-
ness may be in the eyes of the beholder. This raises questions as 
24Note the word "particular" instead of "unnecessary." The requirement that a particular hardship also had to be unnecessary to justify a variance is 
made clear by the definition of hardship which followed this sentence in the bill and now appears in the statute. 
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to whether the term means a use that is reasonable as viewed by 
society as a whole, as viewed by a potential purchaser with an 
eye to exploitation, or as viewed by the Sierra Club. 
Moreover, the reasonableness may or may not be interpreted 
within the framework of private ownership. It may, for exam-
ple, be perfectly reasonable that a given property be preserved 
as open space, maintained as wildlife habitat, or paved as a 
parking area. But is it reasonable to expect a private party to 
assume the costs of ownership when the benefits of the' 'reason-
able use" are diffused generally throughout a neighborhood or 
the public in general? Probably not, but the statutory language 
could lead a conscientious board of adjustment to that conclu-
sion and force a private landowner to go to court to preserve 
constitutionally protected rights in property. 
Recognizing that court action may be necessary to resolve 
these remaining ambiguities, we will assume for the moment 
that to get variance an applicant must satisfy the unnecessary 
hardship criterion. Without raising confounding questions of 
interpretation, what does the statute require to be found before 
the board of adjustment legally can make an affirmative re-
sponse? There appear to be six: 
1) The terms of variances must be in harmony with the general 
purposes and intent of official controls. 
2) The subject property cannot be put to a reasonable use as 
restricted by the ordinance. 
3) The plight of the landowner is due to circumstances affecting 
only that specific property. 
4) The landowner did not create the circumstances causing his 
own difficulties. 
5) The issuance of the variance will not alter the essential 
character of the locality. 
6) If the property can be put to a reasonable use as restricted, 
something more than economic considerations must be in-
volved in the alleged hardship. 
All of the above must be present to justify a variance, 
including number six, which, read literally, seems to take the 
decision completely out of the context of the market. In a 
broader legal context, the result of this interpretation is that the 
statutory requirements for the granting of "non-use" variances 
in Minnesota counties are as stringent as those generally applied 
in other states for the granting of' 'use'' variances. It is unlikely 
that this interpretation is correct, but the point is clearly argu-
able. Any other interpretation makes the extreme detail defining 
"hardship" into excess statutory baggage, violating a basic 
tenet of statutory construction. 
Effect on the Environment 
The applicant for a variance may face another hurdle if the 
board of adjustment chooses to exercise an option expressly 
made available to it in a new section added to the county 
planning act in 1974. Section 394.362 now provides that if the 
applied-for variance in the opinion of the board of adjustment 
"may result in a material adverse effect on the environment," 
the applicant ''may be requested by the board to demonstrate the 
nature and extent of the effect.'' How the solicitous nature of 
this language may affect the discretion of the board seems 
uncertain, but the new section appears to introduce extrinsically 
an implied statement of purpose into the local ordinance. As in 
the case of a similar provision for conditional use permits, the 
value of the 1974 addition is questionable. 
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Notice and Hearing Requirements 
The 1974 amendments made the process of determining the 
satisfaction of statutory standards, however interpreted, a very 
visible one by requiring prior public hearing with written notice 
to interested parties specified by statute. This has proven to be a 
controversial measure. 
It first should be noted that in 1973, although hearings on 
zoning variance applications were required in 5/6ths of all 
county zoning ordinances (either by the ordinance itself or 
because the decision was made by the board of adjustment, 
whose acts were required by statute to be preceded by a hearing) 
notice of the hearings was slight. Only a third of the ordinances 
required notice to the public, and fewer than J/6th provided for 
notice to neighboring landowners, usually confined to those 
within 300 feet. 
The amending bills as introduced mandated a hearing on all 
applications with notice to the applicant, the public, the town 
board for that township, the governing body of any city within 
two miles and all property owners of record within 500 feet. The 
House, acting on the recommendations of the Committee on 
Environmental Preservation and Natural Resources, amended 
the bill to provide for notice to all property owners of record 
within Yz mile in unincorporated areas and 500 feet in incorpo-
rated areas. The Senate bill was similarily amended by floor 
action in the House, and the same language was retained in the 
conference bill finally enacted. 
The bill subsequently passed both houses and became law in 
that form. County officials expressed their opposition, and in 
1976 a further amendment changed the hearing notice require-
ment with respect to other landowners in unincorporated areas 
to owners of record within 500 feet or the 10 properties nearest 
the property of the applicant, whichever would provide notice to 
more landowners. This arrangement, which seems equally well-
adapted to built-up, unincorporated places, found in many lake-
shore areas, and sparsely settled sections of the state, has 
remained in the statute to date. We may note in passing that 
neither the' municipal planning act nor the enabling legislation 
for township planning and zoning require procedures of this 
nature. 
An interesting innovation was adopted in the House on 
recommendation of the House Committee on Environmental 
Protection and Natural Resources but not appearing in the con-
ference committee bill. It attempted to make hearing notice 
more meaningful by requiring that language in the notice de-
scribe the subject property in a manner designed to be under-
standable to the layman without reference to legal documents. 
The logic of such a provision is clear if one concedes the value of 
citizen participation as a guard against governmental caprice. 
Authority to Attach Conditions 
The discretionary power of the board of adjustment may be 
constrained by statutorily imposed prerequisite findings for 
ordering the issuing of a variance. However, the board's author-
ity in cases where factual circumstances justify an affirmative 
response is inflated significantly by a statutory provision added 
in 1974 that allows the board to attach conditions to the 
variance. 
The purpose of such conditions is' 'to insure compliance and 
to protect adjacent properties and the public interest.'' In con-
trast with similar provisions regarding the issuing of conditional 
use permits, there are no further guidelines as to the types of 
conditions that may be imposed lawfully. The language was 
taken from the municipal planning act, where it has apparently 
not been a problem. 
Recordation 
To provide notice to prospective buyers and mortgagees and 
other parties with an interest in the value of a property for which 
a variance has been granted. the statute now requires that a 
certified copy of the order for the issuance of the variance be 
filed with the county recorder or registrar of titles. This assures 
that any conditions attached to the variance, perhaps constitut-
ing an encumbrance on the property, will appear on record in the 
abstract of chain of title. 25 
The required filing seems unnecessary when variances are 
granted with no conditions attached. Under these circum-
stances, property developed or used in keeping with the vari-
ance would become a lawful non-conformity, and any interested 
party would receive constructive notice by virtue of the record-
ing of official controls and the opportunity to see the property 
itself. 
Court Review 
As to review of a board of adjustment response to a variance 
request, the statute continues to provide for de novo26 and 
exclusive review in the district court of the county where the 
subject property is located. This statutory appeal on questions of 
law and fact seems a bit of a curiosity by contrast with Minne-
sota Supreme Court decisions restricting review of denials of 
conditional use permits to review in the nature of a certiorari, 
refusing to allow the introduction of evidence of additional 
decisional bases at trial. 
The difference in scope of review seems unjustified and may 
be due only to differing attitudes of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court and the Minnesota Legislature. The latter apparently 
decided to remain silent on the question of scope of review of 
denials of applications for conditional use permits. De novo 
review by the courts may reduce the incentive for the board of 
adjustment to make thorough investigations and carefully re-
cord findings and determinations. In the absence of legal chal-
lenge, opportunities for an abuse of discretion are greater where 
such departures from proper procedures are condoned. 
Standing to appeal to district court, limited to 30 days after 
actual notice of a board's decision, is also awarded statutorily 
and is apparently confined to any aggrieved person or persons 
(presumably including corporations and other legal entities) and 
any department, board, or commission of that county or of the 
state. 
The legislative history is interesting. HF 2591 was amended 
in committee to provide standing to any department, board, or 
commission of any political subdivision of the state. Although 
this extension was preserved through the amendment and adop-
tion by the House of SF 2576, it did not appear in the enacted 
conference bill. Consequently, the standing of a township or 
nearby municipality to institute a legal challenge is cast into 
doubt, despite the notice requirement with respect to hearings 
that is required before the decision that they might wish to 
challenge. Standing may arise elsewhere, however. 27 
Concluding Comments 
This rather exhaustive account of post-amendment county 
planning act provisions that authorize but carefully limit the 
exercise of discretion in the administration of zoning ordinances 
would be hard to summarize. The reader who feels a compelling 
need for a cursory review is referred to the portion of the 
introductory comments that presents an overview of the Minne-
sota approach juxtaposed with the A.L.I. Model Land Develop-
ment Code. A re-examination of those introductory remarks 
may also serve to explain the lack of comparison with the 
MLDC in the particularized account of statutory law in Minne-
sota. With rare exception, most obviously with respect to hear-
ing and notice prodedures, the MLDC leaves to each political 
subdivision decisions that in Minnesota have been largely re-
moved from local discretion. 
In neither case, however, has the state invaded delegated 
local authority to make substantive regulatory law. It is almost 
totally in the area of procedural law that statewide uniformity is 
decreed. Express power to regulate has in fact been enlarged. It 
is the way that power will be exercised that is prescribed. 
Two basic premises seem to underline the Minnesota county 
planning enabling law provisions described in this publication. 
One is that, in this area of law, the advantages of local control 
are great enough to justify intensive and detailed state legislative 
attention. The other is that proper discretionary administration 
of zoning ordinances is crucial to successfully regulating private 
land use, perhaps surpassing in importance even the establish-
ment of zoning districts and the adoption of development stan-
dards in the ordinance itself. 
Neither premise is safe from attack. There are, particularly, 
those critics who insist that only through higher levels of direct 
intervention by the state will our natural resources be protected 
adequately. The influence of this line of thought has been 
manifested in the enactment of specialized regulatory programs 
in which state agencies play a leading role. Examples include: 
Minnesota's wild and scenic rivers, shoreland management, 
power plant siting, critical areas, and flood plain management 
programs. Even in these programs, however, the close watch of 
the state over discretionary administrative decisions demon-
strates awareness of their potential impact. 
Prior to the 1974 amendments, county land use control 
programs were hampered by inadequate enabling laws. They 
probably still are, but the new and continuing provisions 
discussed in this publication appear to be a major step toward a 
more favorable institutional climate for future regulatory 
activity. 
25 1t should be noted here that copies of ordinances themselves must also be filed for record but do not constitute encumbrances in real estate. 
26See footnote 1 0. 
27Minn. Stat. § 1168 (9) (1976) as one example (conferring to essentially any conceivable entity the right to intervene in any administrative procedure that may 
involve impairment of the environment). 
14 
References 
Court Cases 
Brown v. Beuc, 384 SW2d 845 (Mo. App. 1964) 
Czech v. City of Blaine, Minn. , 253 NW2d 272 (1977) 
Denny v. City of Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 202 NW2d 892 (1972) 
Inland Construction Co. v. City of Bloomington, 292 Minn. 374, 
195 NW2d 588 (1972) 
Merriam Park Community Council, Inc., v. McDonough, 299 
Minn. 285, 210 NW2d 416 (1973) 
Metro 500, Inc., v. City of Brooklyn Park, 297 Minn. 294, 211 
NW2d 358 (1973) 
Minnetonka Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc., v. Svee, 
303 Minn.79, 226 NW2d 306. 
Osiusv. St. Clair Shores, 344Mich. 693,75 NW2d 25,58 ALR2d 
1079 (1976) 
Sun Oil Company v. Village of New Hope, 300 Minn. 326, 220 
NW2d 256 (1974) 
Zylka v. Crystal, 283 Minn·. 192, 167 NW2d 45 (1969) 
Statutes 
Minn. Stat. §104.01-104.07 (1976) 
Minn. Stat. §104.31-104.40 (1976) 
Minn. Stat. §105.485 (1976) 
Minn. Stat. Ch. 116B (1976) (Environmental Rights Act) 
Minn. Stat. Ch. 116C (1976) 
Minn. Stat. Ch. 1160 (1976) 
Minn. Stat. §375.01 and 375.025 (1976) 
Minn. Stat. §394.21-394.37 (1971)(1974)(1976)(1977 
Supplement) 
Minn. Stat. §467 (1976) 
Minn. Stat. Ch. 505 (1976) 
Minn. Stat. Ch. 514 (1976) 
Minn. Stat. Ch. 645 (1976) 
Session Laws 
Laws of Minn. Ch. 177 (1976) 
Laws of Minn. Ch. 210 §1-12 (1949)(repealed 1974) 
15 
Laws of Minn. Ch. 340 §1-23 (1939)(repealed 1974) 
Laws of Minn. Ch. 571 (1971) (1974) 
Laws of Minn. Ch. 559 (1959) 
Miscellaneous 
Advisory Committee on Zoning, Department of Commerce, A 
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act Under Which Municipali-
ties May Adapt Zoning Regulations (rev. ed., 1926) 
American Land Planning Law (N. Williams, 1977) 
American Law Institute, Model Land Development Code ( 1976) 
American Law of Zoning (R.M. Anderson, 1977) 
Attorney General Opinion 125a 66, June 6, 1978 
Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968) 
Clausen, Suburban Land Conversion in the United States 
D. W. Craig, ''Discretionary Land Use Controls--The Iron Whim 
of the Public" in I Proceeding, Institute of Planning, Zoning 
and Eminent Domain 9, (Southwest Legal Foundation, 1971) 
J. J. Davis, Illinois Zoning: Every Use a Special Use, 1974 U. Ill. 
L.F. 340, 350 
House File 2591 (as introduced), 68th Legislature (Minn. 1974) 
Journal of the House, 68th Legislature (Minn. 1974) 
Journal of the Senate, 68th Legislature (Minn. 1974) 
Minn. Reg. Cons. 70 to 77 (1970 ed.) 
R. Snyder and J. Jannetta, County Zoning Variance Administra-
tion in Minnesota: A Study of Diversity, Extension Bulletin 439 
(1979 Minn.) 
R. Snyder, Organizational Arrangements for County Planning, 
Ag. Ext. Serv. Sp. Rept. 48 (rev. 1976, Minn.) 
R. Snyder, Zoning Principles and Definitions, Extension Folder 
251 (rev. 1978, Minn.) 
Samuel Mermim, Law and the Legal System 
Senate File 2576 (as introduced), 68th Legislature (Minn. 1974) 
Standard City Planning Enabling Act, U.S. Department of Com-
merce (:1928) Act of Sept. 2, 1964, Pub. L. 88-560, Sec. 316, 
78 Stat. 793 
